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Abstract. The first stage of research, twenty years ago, on the subclass
of 1-convex TU games dealt with its characterization through some regu-
lar core structure. Appealing abstract and practical examples of 1-convex
games were missing until now. Both drawbacks are solved. On the one
hand, a generating set for the cone of 1-concave cost games is introduced
with clear affinities to the unanimity games taking into account the com-
plementary transformation on coalitions. The dividends within this new
game representation are used to characterize the 1-concavity constraint
as well as to investigate the core property of the Shapley value for cost
games. We present a simple formula to compute the nucleolus and the
τ -value within the class of 1-convex/1-concave games and show that in a
1-convex/1-concave game there is an explicit relation between the nucle-
olus and the Shapley value. On the other hand, an appealing practical
example of 1-concave cost game has cropped up not long ago in Sales’s
Ph.D study of Catalan university library consortium for subscription to
journals issued by Kluwer publishing house, the so-called library cost
game which turn out to be decomposable into the abstract 1-concave
cost games of the generating set mentioned above.
Keywords: cooperative TU game, 1-concavity, library cost game, Shap-
ley value, nucleolus.
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1 Introduction
We consider cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU games). The first
option when searching for a solution to a cooperative game is the core. In the
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core no coalition of agents ends up preferring to stay alone to that resulting
from overall cooperation. However, the possibility of an empty core is a serious
limitation of the core concept. A rich class of TU games with a nonempty core
is the class of convex games if we apply the surplus game interpretation of TU
game and respectively the class of concave games in the cost sharing approach.
For a convex (respectively concave) game the Shapley value [6] appears to be a
core selector and occupies a central position within the core coinciding with the
barycenter of the core vertices that are in turn marginal contribution vectors [7].
Simple and well-known examples of convex games are the so-called unanimity
games that create a basis in the game space. Many practical economic exam-
ples of convex/concave games are known as well. Another class of TU games
with a nonempty core is the class of 1-convex (respectively 1-concave in the cost
game interpretation) games introduced in Driessen and Tijs [2] and Driessen
[1]. The Shapley value of a 1-convex/1-concave game is not necessarily a core
selector while the nucleolus [5] defined as a minimizer for lexicographic ordering
of components of the excess vector that being a solution to some optimization
problem, in general, is not easy to compute, appears to be linear and therefore
simple to determine. However, until recently there were no attractive abstract
and practical examples of a 1-convex or 1-concave game. An appealing example
of a 1-concave game has cropped up not long ago in Sales’s study [4] of Cata-
lan university library consortium for subscription to journals issued by Kluwer
publishing house, the so-called library cost game.
In this paper we continue the study of 1-concave games. We introduce a 1-
concave basis for the space of all TU games with clear affinities to the unanimity
games taking into account the complementary transformation on coalitions. The
dividends within this new game representation are used to characterize the 1-
concavity constraint as well as to investigate the core-property of the Shapley
value for cost games. We present a simple formula to compute the nucleolus and
the τ -value within the class of 1-convex/1-concave games. We also show that in
a 1-convex/1-concave game there is an explicit relation between the nucleolus
and the Shapley value. We apply the results obtained to study the library cost
game mentioned above.
2 Preliminaries
Recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2 players
and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of N ,
satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N ) of s players is called a coalition,
and the associated real number v(S) presents the worth of the coalition S. For
simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of 〈N, v〉
when refer to a game and omit braces when writing one or two-player coalitions
such as {i} or {i, j}. We also use standard notation x(S) = ∑i∈S xi for all
x ∈ IRn, S ⊆ N , and a vector x ∈ IRn is said to be efficient in the game v if
x(N) = v(N). For any set A denote its cardinality by |A|. The set of all games
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with a fixed player set N we denote GN ; GN can be naturally identified with the
Euclidean space IR2
n−1. It is well known [6] that the set of unanimity games
{uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
, defined as
uT (S) =
{
1, T ⊆ S,
0, T 6⊆ S, for all S ⊆ N,
creates a basis in GN , i.e., every game v ∈ GN can be uniquely presented in the
linear form
v =
∑
T⊆N
T 6=∅
λvT uT , (1)
where for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,
λvT =
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−s v(S). (2)
The coefficient λvT is referred to as a dividend of coalition T in game v.
The core of a game v ∈ GN is defined as
C(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅}.
The Shapley value [6] of a game v ∈ GN can be given by
Shi(v) =
∑
T⊆N
T3i
λvT
t
, for all i ∈ N. (3)
Generally, the Shapley value is not a core selector.
For a game v ∈ GN , the excess of a coalition S ⊆ N with respect to a vector
x ∈ IRn is given by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
The nucleolus n(v) [5] is defined as a minimizer for lexicographic ordering of
components of the excess vector arranged in decreasing order of their magnitude
over the imputation set
I(v) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = v(N), xi ≥ v(i), for all i ∈ N}.
If the core of a game is not empty then the nucleolus belongs to the core.
Let mvi be the marginal contribution of the player i, i ∈ N , to the grand
coalition N , i.e.,
mvi = v(N)− v(N\i),
and
avi = max
S3i
[
v(S)−mv(S\i)].
As it is shown in Tijs [8] for any game v ∈ GN with a nonempty core, the vectors
mv = {mvi }i∈N and av = {avi }i∈N present respectively the upper and the lower
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bounds for the core elements, i.e., if C(v) 6= ∅ then for each x ∈ C(v) and all
i ∈ N , it holds
avi ≤ xi ≤ mvi .
For each game v ∈ {v ∈ GN | avi ≤ mvi , for all i ∈ N}, the τ -value is defined as
a unique efficient point on the line segment [av, mv], and it can be considered as
the feasible compromise between the ”ideal point” mv and ”disagreement point”
av. In general the τ -value and the nucleolus are different, and even if the core
is not empty the τ -value not necessarily belongs to the core.
A game v is convex if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ i,
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ i)− v(T ),
or equivalently, if for all S, T ⊆ N ,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
In a convex game the core is always nonempty, the Shapley value belongs
to the core and coincides with the barycenter of the core vertices that in turn
are marginal contribution vectors [7]. A unanimity game provides a simple but
valuable example of a convex game.
Another class of games with a nonempty core is a class of 1-convex games
introduced in Driessen and Tijs [2] and Driessen [1].
A game v is 1-convex if
mv(N) ≥ v(N),
and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
v(S) +mv(N\S) ≤ v(N).
Obviously, any additive game v, which means that v(S) =
∑
i∈S v(i), for all
S ⊆ N , is a 1-convex game.
In a 1-convex game v, for every efficient vector x ∈ IRn, the inequalities
xi ≤ mvi , for all i ∈ N , guarantee that x ∈ C(v). In particular, the characterizing
property of a 1-convex game is that the replacement of any single coordinate mvi
in the vector mv by the amount of v(N)−mv(N\i) places the resultant vector
m¯v(i) = {m¯vj (i)}j∈N ,
m¯vj (i) =
{
v(N)−mv(N\i), j = i,
mvj , j 6= i,
for all j ∈ N,
into the core, that means that, for all i ∈ N , m¯v(i) ∈ C(v). Moreover, in a
1-convex game the set of vectors {m¯v(i)}i∈N creates a set of extreme points for
the core C(v) and the core coincides with their convex hull, i.e.,
C(v) = co({m¯v(i)}i∈N ) (4)
In a 1-convex game the Shapley value not necessarily belongs to the core.
But the τ -value is a core selector and occupies the central position in the core
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coinciding with the barycenter of the core vertices {m¯v(i)}, i ∈ N . Moreover, in
a 1-convex game v the τ -value is shown to be
τi(v) = mvi −
mv(N)− v(N)
n
, for all i ∈ N, (5)
and therefore, coincides with the equal allocation of nonseparable contributions
(the EANS value). Furthermore, in a 1-convex game the τ -value and the nu-
cleolus coincide. That presents a special advantage of the class of 1-convex
games since the nucleolus defined as a solution to some optimization problem
that, in general, is difficult to compute, appears to be linear and thus simple to
determine.
It is worth to note that a sum of two 1-convex games and a nonnegative
multiple of a 1-convex game is again a 1-convex game, and as a result of this the
set of all 1-convex games with a fixed player set N presents a cone in the game
space GN . Moreover, as a corollary of equality (4), we add the core additivity
property that was not mentioned in previous works about 1-convexity.
Proposition 2.1. For any two 1-convex games v and w it holds that the core
of their sum is equal to the sum of their cores, i.e.,
C(v + w) = C(v) + C(w).
A TU game may be considered from two different points of view. The surplus
game interpretation views v(S) as the surplus available to coalition S, namely,
the net benefit that agents of S would cash by cooperating. In the cost game ap-
proach we usually replace notation v for characteristic function by c and consider
the worth c(S) of coalition S as a cost of serving all customers in S. The simple
relation binds these two interpretations: to a cost game 〈N, c〉 we associate the
(surplus) game 〈N, v〉 as follows
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
c(i)− c(S), for all S ⊆ N.
Our practical example below of a library game gives an example of a cost game.
In the definition of the core of a cost game the inequality sign changes to the
opposite and notion of convexity replaces by concavity.
The core of a cost game c ∈ GN is given by
C(c) = {x ∈ IRn | x(N) = c(N), x(S) ≤ c(S), for all S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅}. (6)
A cost game c is concave if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ i,
c(S ∪ i)− c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ i)− c(T ),
or equivalently, if for all S, T ⊆ N ,
c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ).
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A cost game c is 1-concave if
mc(N) ≤ c(N), (7)
and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
c(S) +mc(N\S) ≥ c(N). (8)
Remark 2.2. Similarly to 1-convex games the set of all 1-concave games with a
fixed player set N is a cone in the game space GN that includes the additive
games. In a 1-concave game c, for every efficient vector x ∈ IRn, the inequalities
xi ≥ mci , for all i ∈ N , guarantee that x ∈ C(c). The core of a 1-concave game
satisfies the convex hull property (4) and is additive as well. The τ -value in a
1-concave game is given by the same formula (5).
3 The basis of 1-concave complementary unanimity
games
In this paper we focus on the transformation of games so that the roles of any
coalition S and its complementary one N\S are reversed. With every game
v ∈ GN we associate its complementary game v¯ ∈ GN defined as
v¯(S) =
{
v(N\S), S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅, for all S ⊆ N. (9)
Notice, that for any game v ∈ GN , for its complementary game, v¯(N) = 0.
In particular, for every T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, there is an associated complementary
unanimity game u¯T given by
u¯T (S) =
{
uT (N\S), S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅, for all S ⊆ N. (10)
Since u¯N ≡ 0, the game u¯N is out of interest. Instead of u¯N we add another
game u¯∅ with reference to empty set defined by
u¯∅(S) =
{
1, S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅, for all S ⊆ N. (11)
Thus, for all T $ N , the complementary unanimity game u¯T is given by
u¯T (S) =
 1 , S ∩ T = ∅, S 6= ∅,0 , S ∩ T 6= ∅, S 6= ∅,0 , S = ∅. for all S ⊆ N. (12)
A complementary unanimity game appears in a natural way as a primary
unit in the library game under discussion in Sect. 4.
Proposition 3.1. The complementary unanimity game u¯T , for all T $ N , is
1-concave.
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Proof. Consider three separate cases.
Case 1. T = ∅.
For all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, u¯∅(S) = 1. Then since n ≥ 2, for all i ∈ N ,
m
u¯∅
i = u¯∅(N)− u¯∅(N\i) = 1− 1 = 0.
Whence it follows that
mu¯∅(N) = 0 ≤ u¯∅(N) = 1
and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
u¯∅(S) +mu¯∅(N\S) = 1 + 0 ≥ u¯∅(N) = 1,
i.e., both conditions of 1-concavity (7) and (8) are satisfied.
Case 2. T = {k} for some k ∈ N .
Then
u¯k(N) = 0,
u¯k(N\k) = 1,
and for all i ∈ N\k,
u¯k(N\i) = 0.
Therefore, mu¯kk = −1 and for all i ∈ N\k, mu¯ki = 0.
Thus,
mu¯k(N) = −1 ≤ u¯k(N) = 0,
and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
if k ∈ S then
u¯k(S) +mu¯k(N\S) = 0 + 0 ≥ u¯k(N) = 0,
if k /∈ S then
u¯k(S) +mu¯k(N\S) = 1 + (−1) = 0 ≥ u¯k(N) = 0,
and both 1-concavity conditions (7) and (8) are met.
Case 3. 2 ≤ t < n.
Then
u¯T (N) = 0,
and for all i ∈ N ,
u¯T (N\i) = 0.
Hence, mu¯Ti = 0, for all i ∈ N . For all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, u¯T (S) is equal either 1 or
0. Therefore, the conditions (7) and (8) are valid again. uunionsq
8 Theo S.H.Driessen, Anna B.Khmelnitskaya, Jordi Sales
Now we show that the set of complementary unanimity games {u¯T }T$N (12)
creates a basis for the entire game space GN and, in particular, is a generating
set for the cone of 1-concave cost games.
The number 2n − 1 of elements in the set {u¯T }T$N coincides with the di-
mension of the space GN . Hence, it suffices to show that any game v ∈ GN can
be presented as a linear combination of games u¯T , T $ N . Next theorem pro-
vides an expansion of any game v ∈ GN via the set of complementary unanimity
games.
Theorem 3.2. Any game v ∈ GN can be presented as a linear form
v =
∑
T$N
λ¯vT u¯T , (13)
where for all T $ N
λ¯vT =
∑
S⊇N\T
(−1)t−n+sv(S). (14)
Proof. For a game v ∈ GN consider its complementary game v¯. From (9) it
follows that for all S ⊂ N , S 6= N ,
v(S) = v¯(N\S). (15)
The game v¯ can be presented via unanimity basis {uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
, i.e. for any S ⊆ N ,
v¯(S)
(1)
=
∑
T⊆N
T 6=∅
λv¯T uT (S),
which in particular is the same as, for any S ⊆ N ,
v¯(N\S) =
∑
T⊆N
T 6=∅
λv¯T uT (N\S), (16)
where for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,
λv¯T
(2)
=
∑
S⊆T
(−1)t−sv¯(S) (9)=
∑
S⊆T
S 6=∅
(−1)t−sv(N\S) =
∑
R⊇N\T
R 6=N
(−1)r+t−nv(R).
It is easy to see from (14) and the last chain of equalities that for all T ⊂ N ,
T 6= N , T 6= ∅, it holds
λv¯T = λ¯
v
T − (−1)t v(N), (17)
and besides,
λ¯v∅ = v(N). (18)
Now we prove that for all S ⊆ N ,
v(S) =
∑
T$N
λ¯vT u¯T (S).
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If S = ∅, then the last equality is true since both sides are equal to zero.
If S = N , then ∑
T$N
λ¯vT u¯T (N)
(12)
= λ¯v∅ × 1
(18)
= v(N).
Consider now the case when S 6= ∅ and S 6= N . Then
v(S)
(15),(16)
=
∑
T⊆N
T 6=∅
λv¯T uT (N\S) S 6=∅=
∑
T$N
T 6=∅
λv¯T uT (N\S)
(12)
=
∑
T$N
T 6=∅
λv¯T u¯T (S).
From here and because of equalities (17)–(18) it follows that
v(S) =
∑
T$N
λ¯vT u¯T (S)− v(N)
∑
T$N
(−1)t u¯T (S).
But due to the binomial theorem
∑
T$N
(−1)t u¯T (S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
(−1)t =
n−s∑
t=0
(
n−s
t
) · (−1)t = [(−1) + 1]n−s = 0.
This completes the proof. uunionsq
By analogy with coefficients {λvT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
in the decomposition (1) of a game v ∈
GN via unanimity games {uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
, the coefficient λ¯vT in the game representation
(13) via complementary unanimity games {u¯T }T$N is called a complementary
dividend of coalition T in game v.
Remark 3.3. It is worth to note that the complementary dividend λ¯v∅ of the
empty coalition coincides with the worth of the grand coalition, i.e., λ¯v∅ = v(N),
while the complementary dividend of every single player is equal to the inverse
of this player’s marginal contribution to the grand coalition, i.e., for all i ∈ N ,
λ¯vi = −mvi .
Remark 3.4. From Remark 3.3 it follows directly that in a cost game c ∈ GN the
vector {−λ¯ci}i∈N ∈ IRn provides a lower bound for the core C(c). Moreover, if a
game c is 1-concave, then due to Remark 2.2, for every efficient vector x ∈ IRn,
the inequalities xi ≥ −λ¯ci , for all i ∈ N , guarantee that x ∈ C(c).
The direct corollary to Theorem 3.2 is the redefinition of 1-concavity in terms
of complementary dividends given in the next statement.
Proposition 3.5. A cost game c ∈ GN is 1-concave if and only if the collection
of complementary dividends {λ¯cT }T$N satisfies conditions
λ¯c∅ +
∑
i∈N
λ¯ci ≥ 0,
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and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, ∑
T⊆N\S
t≥2
λ¯cT ≥ 0.
Corollary 3.6. A 3-person cost game c is 1-concave if and only if the following
inequalities are satisfied
λ¯c∅ + λ¯
c
1 + λ¯
c
2 + λ¯
c
3 ≥ 0, λ¯c12 ≥ 0, λ¯c23 ≥ 0, λ¯c13 ≥ 0.
Due to (10)–(11), for every T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, the complementary unanimity
game u¯T and the unanimity game uT , relate to each other via relation
u¯T (S) = u¯∅(S)− u∗T (S), for all S ⊆ N,
where for any game v ∈ GN , v∗ is its dual game defined as
v∗(S) = v(N)− v(N\S), for all S ⊆ N.
It is known that for all v ∈ GN , the Shapley value of both games v and v∗
coincide. Whence it follows that, for every T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, and i ∈ N ,
Shi(u¯T ) = Shi(u¯∅)− Sh(uT ) =

1
n
− 1
t
, i ∈ T,
1
n
, i /∈ T.
(19)
Therefore, because of the game representation (13), for any game v ∈ GN , for
all i ∈ N , the Shapley value Shi(v) can be presented in terms of complementary
dividends as
Shi(v) =
1
n
∑
T$N
λ¯vT −
∑
T$N
T3i
λ¯vT
t
. (20)
Thus, the Shapley value in terms of the complementary dividends is determined
by the egalitarian allocation among the players of the overall amount of com-
plementary dividends reduced by the player’s overall per capita complementary
dividend with reference to coalitions containing the player, while the Shapley
value in terms of Harsanyi dividends (3) is the player’s per capita dividend with
reference to coalitions containing the player.
From (6), (13), and (20) it is not difficult to arrive to
Proposition 3.7. The Shapley value of a cost game c ∈ GN belongs to the core
C(c) if and only if the collection of complementary dividends {λ¯cT }T$N satisfies
for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the condition∑
T$N
T∩S 6=∅
[
s− n |S ∩ T |
t
]
λ¯cT ≤
∑
T$N\S
[
n− s ] λ¯cT .
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For 1-concave games the above conditions can be simplified. Indeed, from
the Shapley value representation (20) and in view of Remark 3.4 stressing that
in 1-concave cost game c the vector {−λ¯ci}i∈N provides an exact lower bound
for the core C(c) it follows
Proposition 3.8. The Shapley value of a 1-concave cost game c ∈ GN belongs to
the core C(c) if and only if the collection of complementary dividends {λ¯cT }T$N
satisfies for all i ∈ N , the condition
1
n
∑
T$N
λ¯cT ≥
∑
T$N
T3i, T 6=i
λ¯cT
t
.
It turns out that in both classes of 1-convex and 1-concave games the nucle-
olus possesses a simple representation via complementary dividends. Indeed, as
it was already mentioned above it is known [2] that on the class of 1-convex/1-
concave games the nucleolus coincides with the τ -value that in turn agrees with
the EANS value. Hence, together with the expression (5) for the τ -value in a
1-convex/1-concave game (see also Remark 2.2) and Remark 3.3 it follows that
for any 1-convex/1-concave game v ∈ GN ,
ni(v) = τi(v) =
1
n
[
λ¯v∅ +
∑
j∈N
λ¯vj
]− λ¯vi , for all i ∈ N. (21)
Notice that for 1-convex/1-concave cost games due to (20)–(21) there is an
explicit relation that binds the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
Proposition 3.9. For any 1-convex/1-concave cost game v ∈ GN , for all i ∈ N ,
Shi(v) = ni(v) +
1
n
∑
T$N
t>1
λ¯vT −
∑
T$N
T3i, T 6=i
λ¯vT
t
.
Remark 3.10. It is also worth to note that in view of Proposition 3.9 the core
property of the Shapley value for 1-concave cost games given in Proposition 3.8
can be reformulated in terms of the difference between the Shapley value and
the nucleolus that in turn always belongs to the core. Indeed, the Shapley value
of a 1-concave cost game c belongs to the core C(c) if and only if,
n(c)− Sh(c) ≤ 1
n
[
λ¯c∅ +
∑
j∈N
λ¯cj
]
e,
where by e we denote the vector with all components equal to 1.
Consider now the Moulin’s reduced game 〈T, vxT 〉 [3] that is defined for any
game v ∈ GN , coalition T ⊆ N , and efficient vector x ∈ IRn, by
vxT (S) = v(S ∪ (N\T ))− x(N\T ), for all S ⊆ T, S 6= ∅. (22)
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Theorem 3.11. The nucleolus is consistent within the class of 1-convex/1-con-
cave games with respect to the Moulin’s reduced game.
Proof. As it was already mentioned above in a 1-convex/1-concave game the
nucleolus coincides with the EANS value. Moulin [3] proves that the EANS
value is consistent with respect to the reduced game given by (22). Thus, to
complete the proof it suffices to show that the Moulin’s reduced game 〈T, vxT 〉
inherits the 1-convexity/1-concavity property if the initial game v is 1-convex/1-
concave. We present the proof only for the case of 1-concavity. The 1-convexity
case can be proved similarly by replacement of inequality signs to the opposite.
In a 1-concave cost game c the nucleolus is always a core selector. Hence,
without loss of generality, for the proof of the consistency property of the nu-
cleolus on the class of 1-concave cost games with respect to Moulin’s reduced
game it suffices to consider only efficient vectors x ∈ IRn that satisfy additional
condition
xi ≥ mci , for all i ∈ N. (23)
Now notice that from (22) it easily follows that the marginal contributions
to the grand coalition in both games c and cx coincide, i.e., mc
x
T
i = m
c
i , for all
i ∈ T . Hence,
mc
x
T (T ) = mc(T )
(23)
≤ x(T ),
and because of efficiency of vector x,
mc
x
T (T ) ≤ c(N)− x(N\T ) (22)= cxT (T ),
that is the Moulin’s reduced game meets the first 1-concavity property (7). Next,
for all S ⊆ T , S 6= ∅,
cxT (S) +m
cxT (T\S) (22)= c(S ∪ (N\T ))− x(N\T ) + mc(T\S)
(8)
≥
c(N) − x(N\T ) (22)= cxT (T ),
i.e., the Moulin’s reduced game meets the second 1-concavity property (8) as
well. uunionsq
4 The library game
A university library consortium has become a familiar feature in the current
information landscape. The main goal is the joint purchase of electronic scientific
journals that offers wide and equal opportunities to all the consortium members
in the access to the research material. The main economic problem emerges when
a consortium has to fix the tariff that each member pays in charge for the joint
purchase. Usually the formula for distribution of costs considers several objective
aspects such as the historical demand of journals, i.e., journals in the paper
form that were purchased in the previous time period, the university budget
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and/or the number of students; all these factors in general possess different
weights in order to influence the final allocation. The problem can be approached
from the game theoretical point of view if we consider the consortium members
(universities) as players in a cost game and then apply some classical solution
concepts in order to suggest allocations of the total cost. The properties of the
corresponding game in general are diverse depending on the negotiation clauses
and the way in which prices are fixed. Sales’s Ph.D study [4] of Catalan university
library consortium for subscription to journals issued by Kluwer publishing house
reveals the situations in which the associated cost game belongs to the class of
1-concave games and therefore provides an interesting practical example for this
class of games. Basically this happens when the following conditions are satisfied:
1) there is only one publisher who provides the whole package of electronic
journals, so the university libraries are obliged to buy the full package; 2) in
return for the package the publisher collects the price of the total amount of
units of journals that were included into the global historical demand; and 3)
in the case when nobody bought the journal in the past, the publisher supplies
it charging a reduced price. This model focuses only on the historical demand.
However, this should not be considered as a serious limitation of the model, since
usually in the real life situations just these data play the most important role
in the bargaining procedure between a consortium and a publisher. The game
constructed appears to be a sum of games, one for each journal. Taking into
account a very big amount of journals usually considered in practical situations
this fact appears to be of high relevance to the simplification of the computational
complexity of the problem when applying additive solutions. In the model the
distribution of costs is based on the employment of the Shapley value and the
nucleolus. It is well-known that the Shapley value is an additive solution which
fits well with the additive nature of the game. But it is outstanding to remark
again that the nucleolus also satisfies the additivity property for the class of
1-concave games.
Now we introduce the formal model of the library game. Let N = {1, . . . , n}
be a finite set of n players (universities). G = {1, . . . ,m} is a set of all liable
goods (electronic journals) to be chosen. D = (dij) i∈N
j∈G
is a demand (n ×m)-
matrix where the scalar entry dij ≥ 0 presents the number of units of jth journal
in the historical demand of ith university. Notice that the same player could
purchase several multiple units of the same good (within a university there may
be a few different libraries). Let cj ≥ 0 be the cost per unit of jth journal based
on the price of the paper version in the historical demand whereas α ∈ [0, 1]
is the common percentage for goods that were never requested in the past; in
applications usually α = 10%. The characteristic function cl of the library cost
game 〈N, cl〉 is given by
cl(S) =

∑
j∈G
[∑
i∈S
dij
]
cj +
∑
j∈G∑
i∈S dij=0
α cj , S 6= ∅,
0, S = ∅,
for all S ⊆ N. (24)
It is clear that the library game is a sum of games, one for each journal.
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Proposition 4.1. The library game cl is 1-concave.
Proof. For every j ∈ G, denote by N(j) = {i ∈ N | dij > 0} the historical set
of users of jth journal. For any j ∈ G and any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, the constraint∑
i∈S dij = 0 reduces to dij = 0, for all i ∈ S, or equivalently N(j) ∩ S = ∅,
that is the same as u¯N(j)(S) = 1, where u¯N(j), j ∈ G, is the complementary
unanimity game (12) relevant to the coalition N(j). Therefore, for all S ⊆ N ,
S 6= ∅, it holds ∑
j∈G∑
i∈S dij=0
α cj = α
∑
j∈G
cj u¯N(j)(S).
Due to Proposition 3.1, any game u¯N(j), j ∈ G, is 1-concave. Hence, the library
game cl being a sum of an additive game and a sum of 1-concave games u¯N(j),
j ∈ G, with nonnegative coefficients α · cj is 1-concave as well. uunionsq
To conclude with we apply the results obtained in Sect. 3 to the library cost
game. The library game is a sum of an additive game and a sum of 1-concave
complementary unanimity games with nonnegative coefficients. Therefore, due
to representations of the nucleolus for 1-concave games and the Shapley value
for the complementary unanimity game given by (21) and (19) respectively and
also because of covariance1 of both these values we obtain that for all i ∈ N ,
ni(cl) =
∑
j∈G
dij cj +
α
n
∑
j∈G
|N(j)|≤1
cj − α
∑
j∈G
N(j)={i}
cj ,
Shi(cl) =
∑
j∈G
dij cj +
α
n
∑
j∈G
cj − α
∑
j∈G
N(j)3i
cj
|N(j)| .
According to both values, the cost allocation to any university is composed of
three components, namely two cost charges and one reward compensation. The
first one is the same for both values, and it represents the linear cost charge
induced by individual historical demands dij of universities i ∈ N for journals
j ∈ G. The two other components are responsible for payment for journals that
were not requested in the past by some (or all) universities. In both values they
have the similar structure and differ in the way of summation of journal costs.
In particular, the nucleolus takes into account only the costs of those journals
which either have no historical demand or were requested in the past by a unique
user while the Shapley value is concerned about costs of all journals. Moreover,
the reward compensation in both cases is given only for journals included in the
historical demand of the considered university.
1 A value ξ is covariant if for all games v, for any α > 0 and β ∈ Rn,
αξ(v) + β = ξ({αvS +
∑
i∈S
βi}S⊂N
S 6=∅
).
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The next formula links the Shapley value and the nucleolus in the library
game
Shi(cl) = ni(cl) +
α
n
∑
j∈G
|N(j)|>1
cj − α
∑
j∈G
N(j)3i
|N(j)|>1
cj
|N(j)| , for all i ∈ N.
Due to Proposition 3.8 the Shapley value of the library game belongs to the
core if and only if holds the inequality
1
n
∑
j∈G
cj ≥
∑
j∈G
N(j)3i
|N(j)|>1
cj
|N(j)| , for all i ∈ N.
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